Stablecoin Adoption: How Bank Rates Shape Growth11 min read2,221 words

Stablecoin Adoption: How Bank Rates Shape Growth

A BIS study finds higher bank deposit rates can slow stablecoin growth, especially USDC. Explore what the findings mean for adoption and U.S. policy today.

stablecoin adoptionbank deposit ratesUSDCUSDTstablecoin regulation
Stablecoin Adoption: How Bank Rates Shape Growth

How Bank Deposit Rates Could Slow Stablecoin Adoption

Stablecoins are often pitched as "digital dollars" that sit outside traditional banking. But their growth doesn't happen in a vacuum. One factor that may still matter is a very familiar one: the interest rate you can get by keeping money in a savings account.

A working paper from Bank for International Settlements economist Iñaki Aldasoro and Rashad Ahmed of the Andersen Institute for Finance and Economics argues that stablecoin growth slowed when U.S. banks raised deposit rates. The relationship appeared stronger for Circle's USDC than for Tether's USDT. That doesn't mean bank rates automatically determine stablecoin demand, or that people simply swap a bank account for a token. Still, it suggests the boundary between "banking" and "stablecoins" is blurrier than it can look at first glance.

That distinction matters now that U.S. policymakers are debating whether stablecoin issuers should be allowed to pay yield - and, if so, how those products should be backed and managed. This article lays out what the researchers measured, what their results support, what they don't, and how issuers, banks, and regulators should read the findings.

What the BIS working paper found

The researchers looked at weekly U.S. data from January 2019 through June 2025. Their main takeaway is straightforward: when bank deposit rates rose, stablecoin market growth tended to slow. The market didn't stop growing in their estimates; what changed was the pace, not a shift to outright contraction.

They also describe a noticeable gap between their baseline approach and an alternative method meant to better isolate cause and effect. Over a typical 10-week stretch in the sample, stablecoin market capitalization rose by about 15%. Under the baseline estimate, a one-basis-point increase in deposit rates corresponded to growth of roughly 12%. Under the alternative method, the estimate dropped to around 6%.

A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point. A one-basis-point move can sound small, but the authors argue it's meaningful in a setting where deposit rates tend to change gradually. And the numbers reflect what the paper's model implies - not a promise that every interest-rate uptick will reduce stablecoin growth by a fixed amount.

The authors' identification strategy

It's hard to decide whether bank rates affect stablecoins just by staring at the data. Rates and crypto activity can both shift because of broader economic conditions. To get around that, the authors lean on a feature of how banks adjust pricing. In their description, banks tend to move more slowly with deposit rates until the federal funds rate reaches around 3%. After that threshold, they reprice faster.

This gives them a way to test whether changes in deposit pricing line up with changes in stablecoin growth. The method improves the analysis, but it doesn't remove uncertainty. The result still relies on the data, the modeling choices, and the assumptions needed to treat the relationship as causal.

One more key qualification: this is a working paper. Its findings and conclusions are the authors' and don't necessarily represent BIS views. If you want to read more context, you can compare the paper with the BIS research and publications and the original report that describes it.

How bank rates could affect stablecoin growth

A basic explanation is competition for how people store money. If a bank offers a higher return on deposits, leaving dollars in a bank account can look more attractive than holding a stablecoin that doesn't pay interest. That doesn't make the two products identical - stablecoins can still matter for on-chain settlement, trading, payments, and access to crypto services. But a higher deposit rate changes the opportunity cost of keeping funds in a token instead of cash in a bank account.

This point is especially relevant to the period studied. In the analysis, the stablecoins didn't pay holders interest. When a token is valued more for convenience or access than for a direct financial return, the return available elsewhere can affect how much capital users are willing to leave there.

Deposit rates are not the same as the federal funds rate

The federal funds rate is the headline policy rate, but it isn't what every customer actually gets on a savings account. Banks decide how quickly and how much to pass policy changes to depositors, based on competition, their funding needs, customer behavior, and the costs of other sources of capital.

That gap is why the paper focuses on deposit pricing itself. A move in the Federal Reserve's benchmark rate doesn't instantly translate into the same move across all bank accounts. The "signal" reaches customers through the rates banks actually offer.

For stablecoin issuers, the effect would likely be indirect. If banks raise deposit rates, some customers may find it more attractive to hold dollars in deposits rather than acquire, redeem, or keep stablecoins. Those choices can show up as changes in token circulation and market capitalization. But the paper identifies an aggregate pattern - it doesn't track every individual decision, or prove that a specific person moved funds from a stablecoin into a savings account because of a rate change.

Market capitalization is a useful but incomplete measure

Market capitalization is a common shorthand for how many stablecoins are in circulation. It isn't the same thing as real-world adoption. Market cap doesn't tell you how often people use the tokens, whether activity is mainly payments or trading, or how many holders are active users versus institutions managing liquidity.

So the paper is best read as evidence about one slice of the stablecoin market: supply growth as captured through market capitalization. It's not a complete account of utility, day-to-day transaction use, or long-run demand. For operators and investors, that distinction matters. Slower supply growth might reflect changing funding conditions without necessarily saying the product became less useful.

Why USDC appeared more sensitive than USDT

In the authors' estimates, the relationship between deposit rates and stablecoin growth was stronger for Circle's USDC than for Tether's USDT. They connect that difference to USDC's closer ties to U.S. users. The logic is plausible: a stablecoin that's more exposed to U.S. customers and financial infrastructure may feel U.S. deposit-pricing shifts more strongly.

Still, it would be a mistake to treat this as a broad ranking of the two coins. The study looks at a specific relationship over a specific period. Different user bases, use cases, distribution channels, and market conditions can all shape how a stablecoin responds to rates.

The difference also underlines something that gets lost in "stablecoin adoption" discussions: adoption isn't one uniform process. A token used mainly by U.S. users for dollar access may react differently from one with a more international customer base or a different role in crypto markets. Issuers should think about where demand comes from and what users value before drawing product conclusions from any one aggregate market trend.

For analysts, the practical takeaway is to avoid treating total stablecoin market capitalization as one interchangeable pool. Compare tokens separately, and look at customer exposure and use cases. The researchers' finding suggests that U.S. monetary conditions can affect issuers differently, even when both assets are designed to track the U.S. dollar.

What the findings mean for regulation and adoption

This paper raises a policy question that's bigger than whether stablecoins "compete" with banks. It's about what that competition looks like - and what risks show up when stablecoin issuers can, or can't, pay yield to holders.

The authors argue regulators should consider whether issuers may pay yield, and the trade-offs involved in requiring issuers to hold reserves as bank deposits. Those issues link together. Allowing yield could make stablecoins more attractive for holding dollars. Restrictions could reduce that competition. Requiring bank deposits as part of reserve backing could also tie issuers more closely to the banking system - but the consequences depend on the details and the scale of the requirement.

Yield changes the competitive equation

If issuers are prohibited from paying interest, deposit rates may remain a meaningful factor in whether users choose stablecoins. If issuers are allowed to offer yield, the comparison changes - but it doesn't vanish. The return a stablecoin offers would still need to be weighed against its risks, redemption terms, operating model, and the legal protections for holders.

There's also a policy-design question: where would the yield come from, and who would take on the risks? A debate focused only on whether stablecoins can pay yield may skip the operational questions that really drive outcomes - reserve assets, disclosures, liquidity, and issuer obligations to customers.

In Washington, banks have pushed back against stablecoin yield, and the issue came up during debate around the failed Senate vote on the Clarity Act. At the same time, U.S. agencies including the OCC, FDIC, and Treasury have been working on rules to implement the GENIUS Act. Signed into law in July 2025, the Act sets a federal framework for stablecoin issuance, use, and custody, with implementation continuing into 2027.

The regulatory detail matters more than the headline. The rules will determine what issuers can offer, how reserves are held, what disclosures users receive, and how responsibilities are split between issuers and intermediaries. The Federal Reserve's explanation of monetary policy is a helpful starting point for understanding the broader rate environment, but it doesn't replace the specific requirements that will govern stablecoin products.

The evidence has clear limits

The sample runs from 2019 through June 2025 and includes one high-rate cycle. That's a relatively narrow window for predicting how stablecoins behave across different monetary regimes. Also, this period covers stablecoins that did not pay holders interest. If product features or regulation change, user behavior may shift too.

That doesn't make the research useless. It does mean decision-makers should treat it as evidence about a mechanism - not a final answer about stablecoins' long-term trajectory. One practical way to apply the paper is to ask:

  • For issuers: How dependent is demand on U.S. customers and on the return available from bank deposits?
  • For banks: Are customers using stablecoins for yield, or for things like on-chain settlement and access to digital markets?
  • For regulators: Would a proposed rule reduce a specific risk, or mostly change where users hold dollars?
  • For investors and analysts: Does market-cap growth reflect new use, or a shift in liquidity and funding conditions?

These questions beat the temptation to claim that banks can stop stablecoin adoption - or that they can't influence it at all. The paper supports a narrower conclusion: deposit pricing appears to be one factor shaping the growth rate, and the strength of that relationship varies across stablecoins.

Conclusion

This BIS working paper doesn't show that banks control stablecoin adoption. It does show that bank deposit rates can influence how quickly stablecoin markets grow, and that the relationship can differ between USDC and USDT.

For policymakers, the next step is to weigh yield rules and reserve requirements against their intended outcomes - rather than assuming that limiting one product automatically eliminates competition or risk. For issuers, the practical move is to understand how customer behavior responds to both financial returns and product utility. Read the findings as evidence of a competitive link between banks and stablecoins, not as a forecast of who will win.

Frequently Asked Questions

Not necessarily. The working paper found that stablecoin market growth tended to slow as deposit rates rose. In the researchers’ estimates, stablecoins continued to grow; the pace changed. The result describes a modeled market-level relationship, not a guarantee that a rate increase will cause a contraction.
The relationship was stronger for Circle’s USDC than for Tether’s USDT. The authors suggested that USDC’s closer links to U.S. users may help explain the difference. The finding applies to the study’s data and period; it is not a general measure of either stablecoin’s safety or resilience.
No. The authors use a method designed to better isolate cause and effect, but the estimates remain dependent on the study’s model and assumptions. The paper finds evidence consistent with deposit rates influencing stablecoin growth. It does not establish why every user makes a particular choice.
The stablecoins studied did not pay holders interest. That made bank deposit returns a relevant point of comparison. If issuers are permitted to offer yield, the competitive dynamics could change, along with the questions regulators must answer about reserves, disclosures, liquidity, and consumer protections.
Issuers should treat bank deposit pricing as one potential influence on demand, particularly where their users are concentrated in the United States. They should also measure activity beyond market capitalization, including use cases and customer behavior, before assuming a change in supply reflects a lasting change in adoption.

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