Binance Hack: $594M in ETH Moved Across Chains
Nearly $594 million in ETH linked to the Binance hack moved in two days. See what the transfers, cross-chain routes and remaining wallet balance reveal.

Nearly $600 Million in ETH Moves Through Cross-Chain Routes After Binance Hack
Wallets analysts linked to the Binance hack moved nearly $600 million in Ether across two days, according to blockchain tracking services. The activity included transfers to new wallets and some funds routed through THORChain and Chainflip - cross-chain swap protocols that let users exchange assets between different blockchains.
The headline number is eye-catching, but it needs context. A transfer isn't the same thing as a completed swap, and even a swap doesn't prove that funds became untraceable.
Onchain data can show wallet-to-wallet movement, but it can't, by itself, prove who controlled each address or what happened to every dollar after it changed hands. The key questions are more specific: how much moved, how much used cross-chain services, what still sits in publicly tracked wallets, and what this episode suggests about how well DeFi infrastructure can be monitored. This piece keeps the reported figures separate from what can only be inferred - and explains why that difference matters for exchanges, protocols, and anyone assessing crypto-related risk.
What happened to the Binance-linked ETH?
Wallets associated by analysts with the Binance hack transferred approximately $594 million in ETH over two days. On Thursday, they moved about $248 million. On Friday, they transferred another 197,460 ETH, which was reported at roughly $346 million at the time.
Those dollar figures are estimates based on ETH's market price during the reporting window, not fixed totals. The 197,460 ETH figure is the token quantity for the Friday transfer, which is distinct from the dollar value. Keeping the two measurements separate helps avoid mixing a changing market price into what is essentially an onchain token count.
The reporting links specific addresses to the hack through blockchain analysis. That attribution can be useful, but it isn't the same as a court finding or a direct identification of the people running the wallets. Public blockchain data shows transactions between addresses; connecting those addresses to a specific actor depends on evidence and investigative methods, and sometimes on information outside the chain.
The source reporting also says TRM Labs and Chainalysis linked the $6.3 billion Binance hack to TraderTraitor, a North Korea-linked hacking group. That's an attribution by named analytics firms, not something you can conclude from the ETH transfers alone. The distinction matters because readers may see labels like "hacker wallet" and assume identity and control are fully established.
The immediate story, then, is straightforward: a large amount of ETH moved, and analysts identified some cross-chain routes. The harder part - how much was actually exchanged, whether funds reached a cash-out point, and who controlled each final destination - needs more than the headline transfer total.
How do THORChain and Chainflip fit into the route?
THORChain and Chainflip are cross-chain swap protocols. In practice, they let users swap assets that live on different blockchain networks without a conventional centralized exchange holding the assets during the trade. There are legitimate uses for that, including moving liquidity between ecosystems. But using these services can also make tracing harder when funds tied to a hack use them.
Analyst SomaXBT estimated that THORChain accounted for most of the cross-chain activity identified in this case. Chainflip's share was much smaller: estimates cited by analysts put the amount routed through it at about $5 million. Specter similarly described Chainflip's portion as small. These numbers are still estimates, not a complete audited breakdown of every transaction connected to the implicated wallets.
A cross-chain swap changes the asset or network involved. To understand it, analysts may need to compare deposits, swap activity, liquidity movements, and withdrawals across multiple chains. That's not the same as saying the funds "disappear." Transactions can remain visible on each network, even if connecting one side of the swap to the other requires extra work and assumptions.
Chainflip has said it screens deposits for illicit funds, and it has previously acknowledged gaps in those checks. Screening doesn't mean every risky deposit is detected or stopped. And a reported route through a protocol doesn't automatically show that the service knowingly facilitated criminal activity. Those are separate questions - about the protocol's controls, the facts of specific transactions, and the standards its operators follow.
The data also shows why a protocol name can get more attention than it deserves. THORChain's reported 24-hour swap volume rose to $239 million on Friday, and its dashboard showed $243,000 in protocol earnings. Those figures suggest a busy period and revenue - but they don't prove that all the activity came from the hack-related wallets. Volume reflects activity, not a ledger of criminal proceeds.
What do the transfer totals and wallet balance tell us?
The reported movement of $594 million isn't the same as $594 million successfully laundered or cashed out. Some funds went to new wallets, and only part of the activity was estimated to have passed through Chainflip. THORChain accounted for most of the cross-chain activity reported by SomaXBT, but the available material doesn't provide an independently verified, end-to-end total for completed swaps across every route.
After the latest transfers, Arkham reported that publicly tracked addresses associated with the hackers held about 224,722 ETH, worth roughly $394 million. This is a snapshot of addresses the platform attributed at the time. It's helpful for understanding how much value remained visible in those wallets - but it isn't guaranteed to be a complete inventory of every related address, asset, or movement.
There are several reasons to be careful with the numbers:
- Transfers can be internal repositioning. Moving assets to a new address changes where the coins sit, but it doesn't necessarily change ownership or the ultimate destination.
- Dollar values move with the market. ETH prices at the time of each estimate affect the reported dollar amounts.
- Address attribution is analytical. A wallet's link to an incident depends on the evidence and methods used by the tracking team.
- A swap is not a cash-out. Swapping one token for another doesn't automatically convert funds into fiat or remove the possibility of further tracing.
None of this makes onchain reporting useless - it just limits what it can answer confidently. A public ledger can show timing, token amounts, and flows between addresses. It's less definitive about real-world identity, intent, or whether a specific asset was spent outside the blockchain.
For risk teams, the practical value is maintaining a timeline and updating it as attribution improves. Onchain snapshots can go stale quickly when funds move across multiple networks. Stronger analysis combines transaction records with clear attribution standards and treats estimates as estimates, rather than presenting every tracked dollar as a confirmed final outcome.
Why are cross-chain swaps difficult to monitor?
Crypto compliance systems often start with an asset, a network, and a known address. Cross-chain activity complicates that approach because investigators need to track related events across multiple chains and understand the mechanics of each protocol involved. A clean transaction graph on one network can become harder to interpret when assets move through swaps, liquidity pools, and new wallets.
This is a monitoring problem, not proof of anonymity. Public blockchains preserve transaction records, but they don't always provide a simple one-to-one path from a deposit on one network to a received asset on another. Analysts have to separate likely matches from confirmed ones and consider timing, amounts, fees, and protocol-specific behavior. The quality of the conclusion depends on what data is available and what assumptions are used in the attribution.
The reporting also places the episode in context. North Korea-linked actors have used THORChain before, according to the article, in connection with funds stolen in the $1.4 billion Bybit hack in February 2025 and the $388 million Bitget hack in September 2026. Repeated use can increase scrutiny of a service's risk controls. But it doesn't automatically show that the protocol's developers - or users - knew where the specific funds originally came from.
There's also an operational trade-off for decentralized protocols. Strong screening may make it harder for sanctioned or stolen funds to use a service, but screening only works if detection is reliable, the system has a defined response, and it can act when risk is identified. Controls that exist mainly as policy statements don't provide the same assurance as monitoring that's actually tested, documented, and responsive to new tactics.
Still, the lack of a conventional account-based intermediary doesn't mean there's no accountability. Protocol teams, validators, liquidity providers, analytics firms, and centralized exchanges can each have different parts of the picture. The practical question isn't whether DeFi can be treated exactly like a bank. It's which actors can detect, delay, report, or prevent a specific transaction - and what evidence supports that conclusion.
What should exchanges, protocols and users take from this?
For exchanges, this episode underlines the need to treat wallet intelligence as ongoing work rather than a one-time screening exercise. If funds tied to a hack move to new addresses or shift across chains, risk teams need updated indicators and a clear basis for decisions. An alert should trigger investigation, not an automatic assumption that every related address carries the same risk profile.
For protocols, the tension is between permissionless access and risk management. A protocol may be built to operate without a centralized custodian, but when it appears in high-profile incidents, it can face pressure to show controls are effective. That means being specific about what gets screened, how matches are handled, where the system has limits, and how those limits are improved. Broad claims of comprehensive prevention are hard to support when screening gaps are known.
For analytics firms and reporters, precision in language matters. "Moved," "routed," "swapped," "laundered," and "cashed out" describe different stages. If they're all collapsed into one label, a story can sound more conclusive than the evidence warrants. Separating ETH quantities, estimated dollar values, the observed protocol route, and what remains in tracked wallets gives readers a clearer picture.
For users, the event is a reminder that decentralization doesn't automatically mean privacy, and it doesn't eliminate operational risk. Transaction records may remain public, while interpretation and attribution can change as new information emerges. If you use cross-chain services for normal asset management, it's worth understanding that swaps can add counterparties, protocol mechanics, and compliance considerations. Convenience is only one side of the decision; understanding the route is the other.
The broader takeaway isn't that cross-chain protocols are inherently criminal, or that onchain tracking is always ineffective. Those are both too broad. The useful approach is case-specific: what assets moved, what the protocol actually did, what controls were in place, and what the available data can verify. That's the standard needed to discuss illicit finance and legitimate DeFi without blending them together.
Key takeaways
- Wallets linked by analysts to the Binance hack moved about $594 million in ETH over two days.
- The reported cross-chain activity was concentrated on THORChain, with Chainflip's estimated share around $5 million.
- Arkham tracked approximately 224,722 ETH, worth roughly $394 million, in associated addresses after the transfers.
- Transfer totals don't prove that funds were cashed out, successfully laundered, or made untraceable.
- Screening claims should be judged by demonstrated controls and response processes, not by policy language alone.
Conclusion
The reported movement of nearly $600 million in ETH is a notable development in tracking funds tied to the Binance hack, but it isn't a final accounting of what happened to the money. The available figures point to large transfers, limited estimated Chainflip routing, heavier reported use of THORChain, and a still-substantial balance visible in tracked addresses.
The clearest way to read the story is to separate what the blockchain shows from what analysts infer. Transfers are observable; attribution, completed swaps, and eventual cash-out require more evidence. That distinction leads to better reporting and better risk decisions - especially as crypto activity keeps moving across chains.