NEAR Tokens: How Hackers Laundered Binance Funds12 min read2,394 words

NEAR Tokens: How Hackers Laundered Binance Funds

Elliptic traced $430,000 from the Binance hack through six NEAR memecoins. See how liquidity pools obscured transfers—and why the trail remained traceable.

NEAR token launderingBinance hackcrypto launderingNEAR blockchainDeFi liquidity pools
NEAR Tokens: How Hackers Laundered Binance Funds

How Hackers Used NEAR Memecoins to Move Binance Funds

Cryptocurrency laundering doesn't always require exotic blockchains or cutting-edge techniques. Sometimes it's simpler than that: create a few low-interest tokens, then use decentralized exchange liquidity pools to shuffle funds between wallets. That's the pattern blockchain analytics firm Elliptic said it traced after a major Binance hack. In its account, roughly $430,000 in stolen funds moved through six newly created tokens on NEAR.

The amount matters, but so does the method. Token swaps can make a transaction trail harder to piece together quickly, especially when you're scanning a wallet at a glance. Still, swaps don't delete the record - token contracts, pool activity, and timing remain visible. Elliptic also reported that the newly launched tokens had almost no outside trading and were abandoned soon after they were used.

Here's how the reported scheme worked, what liquidity pools changed in the trail, and what the case can - and can't - tell you about crypto tracing and DeFi controls. It also places the reported $430,000 in context: Elliptic said a much larger balance of stolen NEAR was still unmoved at the time of its analysis.

What happened in the NEAR token laundering scheme?

Elliptic said hackers linked to North Korea moved about $430,000 stolen in the Binance hack through six newly created tokens on NEAR. The activity happened between Nov. 5 and Nov. 7. Rather than sending the same asset from one wallet to another, the operators swapped stolen NEAR into the new tokens, then traded those tokens back into NEAR through liquidity pools.

Elliptic described the tokens as memecoins, but the point here didn't seem to be building a community or launching a product. According to Elliptic, the tokens drew almost no outside trading and were abandoned shortly after launch. In practice, they functioned like temporary waypoints inside a chain of swaps - not like assets that depended on real market demand.

Elliptic also tied the launches together through funding timing. It found that five of the six token creators received money from proceeds of earlier token sales just two to 13 minutes before the next token launch. That tight timing gave investigators another clue: the tokens weren't independent launches, but part of one coordinated sequence.

The $430,000 figure is only part of the wider incident. Elliptic said that at the time of its analysis, about 11.8 million NEAR associated with the Binance hack still hadn't moved. The firm valued that balance at $43.7 million. Those numbers are a snapshot, not a guarantee of what happened later - balances can move, and valuations change with market prices.

It matters to separate the funds routed through the tokens from the larger untouched balance. The token activity shows one way a portion of the stolen assets was moved. It doesn't automatically mean all stolen funds passed through these pools, and it doesn't prove the method was "concealed" from analysts. Elliptic's own reporting shows the sequence was traceable.

Why create tokens with little apparent demand?

A token with almost no independent trading can look pointless if you judge it as a product. But the purpose described by Elliptic wasn't necessarily to build a liquid market. The tokens created intermediate steps between wallets and assets, letting the operators trade into and out of pools rather than making a single, direct transfer.

That choice can slow down anyone trying to follow the trail by hand. It still doesn't make the activity invisible. Token contracts, swaps, and timing remain part of the public transaction history, and the real impact depends on whether those extra steps are enough to delay recognition.

How did liquidity pools obscure the trail?

A direct transfer is straightforward: one wallet sends an asset to another, and the ledger shows that movement as a simple handoff. A swap through a decentralized exchange pool looks different. The user sends one asset into the pool and receives another asset out. If that's repeated across wallets and temporary tokens, the funds move through multiple transactions rather than one clean wallet-to-wallet payment.

Elliptic described two groups of wallets in the NEAR activity. One group swapped stolen NEAR for the newly created memecoins. Another group sold those memecoins back into liquidity pools for NEAR. The net result was value moving between wallets through trades - rather than just transferring the original NEAR from wallet to wallet.

That setup complicates monitoring. A basic alert that expects direct transfers may miss the full route if the asset changes, if a pool contract is involved, and if activity spreads across more than one wallet. Investigators have to reconstruct the sequence: identify the relevant wallets, trace how assets enter and leave pools, connect the token launches to the surrounding trades, and assess whether the activity forms one coordinated flow.

Still, a pool isn't a private tunnel. The swaps are still onchain transactions. The tokens, contracts, order of trades, and amounts exchanged can be examined. The technique changes how the trail appears, but it doesn't remove it. The challenge is analysis and attribution - not some magical break in the public ledger.

A simple way to understand the route

Elliptic's reported process can be summarized in four steps:

  1. Create a new token on NEAR.
  2. Use one wallet group to exchange stolen NEAR for that token through a liquidity pool.
  3. Use a different wallet group to sell the token back into a pool for NEAR.
  4. Repeat the pattern across additional tokens and wallets.

Each swap adds another transaction and changes which asset the wallet holds. That can make the route less obvious when someone scans wallet histories, especially if the intermediate token has little legitimate activity. At the same time, repeated launches, linked funding, and close timing can also point investigators toward a shared sequence.

So the right description is "more complicated," not "erased." Liquidity pools can make the movement less direct. Whether that buys useful time depends on how quickly analysts identify the contracts and connect the wallets, and whether funds can be moved again before responses happen.

What the onchain evidence does - and does not - show

Elliptic's account points to several types of evidence: the token launches, the wallets that interacted with the pools, the swaps between NEAR and the new tokens, and the short gaps between funding token creators and subsequent launches. Taken together, those details are enough to describe a linked sequence rather than a set of unrelated trades.

But that doesn't mean every observation proves who controlled a wallet. Public transaction data can show that an address sent funds, traded a token, or interacted with a contract. Attribution - linking an address to a specific person, group, or organization - takes additional work. Elliptic characterized the hackers as linked to North Korea, but readers should keep in mind the difference between a reported attribution and what a single transaction can establish on its own.

The low level of outside trading is another clue worth handling carefully. A token that rarely trades outside a campaign can stand out, but that alone doesn't automatically prove criminal intent. Analysts still have to look at the full sequence: who funded the launches, when the tokens appeared, which wallets traded them, and how the assets moved before and after.

The same caution applies to the reported value. The approximately $430,000 estimate reflects Elliptic's calculation of funds moved through the scheme. The $43.7 million figure corresponds to the estimated value of the remaining 11.8 million NEAR at the time of analysis. Neither number should be treated as a current balance without updated evidence, since crypto prices move and assets can change hands after a report is published.

Traceability is not the same as recovery

A traceable transaction isn't automatically a recoverable one. Analysts might be able to map a route, but they usually don't have the authority or technical control to freeze funds directly. Recovery depends on factors like whether assets reach a centralized exchange or another service that can act, what jurisdiction applies, and how quickly investigators and those service providers can coordinate.

Adding more steps also doesn't prove laundering "worked." It may increase the time and effort required to understand the route, but the public ledger still preserves transaction records. What happens next - whether funds are identified, frozen, or recovered - is a separate operational and legal question.

That distinction matters when you read blockchain crime reporting. A tracing firm can establish a plausible onchain flow and explain why it believes certain wallets are connected. Those findings are not, by themselves, a full account of who the perpetrators are, where every asset ended up, or what the final outcome of any recovery effort was.

What this case means for exchanges, investigators, and DeFi

For exchanges and compliance teams, Elliptic's reported sequence is a reminder that watching only direct transfers can leave gaps. A good review process needs to account for swaps, token contracts, and decentralized exchange pool activity, along with the wallets that send inputs and receive outputs. If funds change assets along the way, screening only the "starting" token may miss part of the path.

For investigators, this case underscores the value of relationships between events, not just individual transactions. The quick funding of token creators before later launches, the repeated use of newly created tokens, and the low outside trading all helped connect activity across the sequence. Those are signals to investigate, not automatic proof of a crime - and they matter most when paired with known stolen-fund flows and other corroborating evidence.

For DeFi teams, the case doesn't establish that liquidity pools caused theft, or that decentralized exchanges can prevent every illicit trade. Pools are general-purpose infrastructure: they let people trade assets without a centralized order book operated by an intermediary. That openness is part of how DeFi works, and it also means prevention can't rely on the same tools used in centralized settings.

There's also a trade-off. Stronger controls might help services identify or restrict suspicious activity, but they can also affect legitimate users, create operational overhead, and raise questions about who has authority to intervene. What's "right" depends on the service's role, the transaction context, and legal requirements in the relevant jurisdictions. The source material doesn't describe any specific intervention or policy change that came directly from this case.

Elliptic also said the same laundering technique was used after the 2025 Bybit hack. In that case, North Korean-linked actors moved at least $24 million through a newly created token on TRON. The comparison suggests these tactics aren't limited to one chain. It doesn't mean every incident will follow the same steps - operators can adapt the general idea to different networks and circumstances.

A practical monitoring checklist

When reviewing a suspected cross-wallet token route, teams can ask:

  • Were tokens created shortly before the relevant swaps?
  • Did token creators receive funding from proceeds of earlier sales?
  • Were the tokens traded by unrelated participants, or was activity concentrated among a small set of wallets?
  • Do different wallet groups appear to handle the buy and sell legs?
  • Does the sequence connect to assets already associated with a reported theft?
  • Are findings based on observable transactions, or does the analysis also make claims about identity and intent?

These questions help separate transaction reconstruction from attribution. That's important operationally: a strong, explainable evidence trail is more useful than a suspicious-looking wallet label that you can't back up with transaction-level details.

Conclusion

The NEAR case shows how a fairly simple pattern - token launches plus liquidity-pool swaps - can make stolen funds look more complicated as they move between wallets. According to Elliptic, six new tokens were used to route roughly $430,000 from the Binance hack, while a much larger reported balance of stolen NEAR remained unmoved at the time of analysis.

The practical takeaway is specific: focus on how the asset changes and on how wallets relate to each other, not just on direct transfers. Pools can add steps and slow recognition, but they don't erase onchain activity. If you're assessing a crypto-laundering report, keep the distinctions clear: transaction tracing isn't the same as identifying people, and either step doesn't guarantee that funds can be recovered.

Frequently Asked Questions

Elliptic reported that roughly $430,000 in stolen funds was routed through six newly created tokens on NEAR. The report also said about 11.8 million NEAR, valued at $43.7 million at the time of analysis, remained unmoved. These figures describe different portions of the reported funds.
The tokens provided intermediate assets for swaps through liquidity pools. Elliptic said the tokens attracted almost no outside trading and were abandoned soon after launch. Their reported role was to add steps between wallets, not to build a lasting token project or attract a large market.
No. The swaps made the route less direct than a wallet-to-wallet transfer, but they remained onchain. Analysts could examine the wallet activity, token launches, pool interactions and transaction timing. Making a trail more complicated is not the same as removing it.
No. Tracing can help analysts identify how assets moved, but recovery is a separate process. It may depend on whether funds reach a service able to freeze them, the relevant legal authority and how quickly organizations can coordinate. The source report does not say that the funds moved through these tokens were recovered.

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