USDS stablecoin redemptions: What a $2B exit shows
USDS redemptions topped $2B while the stablecoin held its peg. See what the episode reveals about liquidity, reserves and illicit-finance claims.

USDS stablecoin redemptions: What a $2B exit shows
Sky's $2 Billion USDS Exit: A Stress Test, Not a Verdict
More than $2 billion in redemptions is enough to grab attention in any stablecoin. In Sky Protocol's case, its USDS token kept trading at $1 while users swapped it for Circle's USDC through Sky's Peg Stability Module (PSM). Those withdrawals landed the same day a CoinDesk investigation raised questions about transactions tied to illicit activity.
The facts overlap, but they aren't the same claim. Redemptions test whether a system can meet demand at its stated terms. Blockchain analytics can point to connections with risky wallets - but a flagged transaction doesn't automatically prove that a protocol knowingly helped finance anything criminal. And a stable price during one episode doesn't settle every open question about reserves or operational risk.
So this piece keeps the threads separate: what happened during the USDS redemptions, how the PSM works, and what the reported reserve figures can - and can't - tell users. The real question isn't just whether USDS held $1. It's what this episode suggests about liquidity, transparency, and the remaining risks when DeFi relies partly on centralized stablecoins.
What happened during the USDS redemptions?
Sky Protocol processed more than $2 billion in redemptions on a Thursday, according to the reported figures. Users exchanged USDS for USDC through the protocol's PSM, which is set up to enable swaps between the two tokens at a fixed rate. Sky said the peg stayed at $1 throughout the activity.
The scale matters, but it needs context. A redemption is a user exiting or switching tokens - it's not, by itself, proof that reserves are gone, that a stablecoin is insolvent, or that the peg has failed. What matters more is whether the system actually processed withdrawals as expected, whether the assets needed for the mechanism were available, and whether the market price tracked the target.
Sky said the amount of USDC in its PSM didn't drop below $800 million and was back above $1.1 billion by Friday. That's still a protocol statement, not a full independent audit of every asset, liability, and dependency. Still, it's a more concrete liquidity signal than price alone: the system reportedly absorbed large outflows without draining the USDC held in that specific module.
The redemptions also came alongside a sharp contraction in USDS supply. Reportedly, supply fell nearly 40% in one day to about 3.2 billion tokens. Supply dropping can mean holders left - but it doesn't explain why, or whether what remained was still healthy. One wallet linked to the exchange Poloniex reportedly accounted for a large share of withdrawals, but the available information didn't establish that Poloniex itself initiated them.
And then there's timing. The withdrawals occurred around the same period as a CoinDesk investigation published on Nov. 19. That investigation cited research by Inca Digital, which identified $518 million in transactions involving wallets linked to hackers, sanctioned entities, and other threat actors over five years. Even if the dates line up, timing alone doesn't prove the investigation caused the redemptions.
Why the peg is only one measure
USDS trading at $1 is useful - but it isn't a complete solvency test. Prices can look fine while users depend on redemption tools, liquidity providers, or reserves that behave differently once pressure grows or lasts longer. And just because a large redemption day happens doesn't mean the stablecoin has failed, as long as users can exit and the system meets its obligations.
For this episode, it helps to treat three things separately: the USDS market price, the liquidity available through the PSM, and the value and quality of the assets backing the broader stablecoin system. They point to different issues, and they shouldn't be lumped into a single "safe vs. unsafe" conclusion.
How did Sky keep USDS near $1?
The PSM is the central mechanism in Sky's version of events. In practical terms, it lets users swap USDS and USDC at a set rate, within the module's liquidity and operating rules. If someone wants to move from USDS into USDC, the module needs enough USDC on hand to complete the transaction. That gives a direct path for redemptions rather than forcing users to rely only on buyers in an open market.
A fixed-rate swap can support price stability because it offers eligible users a known route: exchange one asset for another at a predictable rate. If the market price of USDS drifts below $1, a holder might have a reason to buy at a discount and redeem through the module - assuming the route is available and the costs make sense. That behavior can pull the market price back toward the intended value.
But the mechanism doesn't conjure USDC out of thin air. Its ability to process redemptions depends on the balance in the module, who can access it, what rules govern that access, what assets can replenish it, and whether the system can execute swaps under stress. Sky's reported USDC floor of $800 million in the PSM matters because it suggests the module retained a substantial buffer during the outflows. It still doesn't prove that the same buffer would hold up in a much larger or longer event - or that every type of redemption would be frictionless in every scenario.
There's also the dependency built into the design: the PSM links a DeFi system to Circle's USDC, which is centrally issued. That introduces a different risk profile. For example, Circle can freeze USDC addresses under certain conditions. If USDC in a redemption mechanism were frozen - or access to it were restricted - Sky's ability to provide swaps on the expected terms could be affected. The "possible freeze" concern is a risk scenario, not proof that Sky's USDC was actually frozen.
What a redemption mechanism can and cannot do
A PSM can give a predictable conversion route and reduce dependence on market depth alone. What it can't do is remove counterparty risk, smart-contract risk, governance risk, or operational risk. And a fixed exchange rate doesn't mean every user can transact instantly without friction - capacity, fees, contract behavior, and asset restrictions still come into play.
For users, the practical check is to understand the exit route itself, not just the token's stated peg. Ask what you receive, which contract or issuer is involved, whether there are limits, and what could block the route. That's more useful than treating the word "stablecoin" as a guarantee of cash-like access.
What do the illicit-finance claims establish?
CoinDesk, citing Inca Digital's research, reported $518 million in transactions over five years involving wallets linked to hackers, sanctioned entities, and other threat actors. It also reportedly associated about $101.9 million with North Korean actors, including wallets connected to the February 2025 Bybit hack.
Those numbers deserve scrutiny, but they need careful interpretation. A volume tied to flagged addresses isn't automatically the same thing as illicit proceeds held by Sky, a loss to USDS holders, or proof that Sky knowingly facilitated criminal activity. Blockchain activity can route through multiple wallets and services, and the counted amount may reflect gross activity across a path rather than unique funds. Attribution confidence can vary, too.
Sky disputed parts of the findings and pointed to an assessment by Block Analitica, described as a risk adviser to the Sky ecosystem. Block Analitica said the $518 million figure represented less than 0.06% of more than $960 billion processed through Sky's PSMs. It also claimed around two-thirds of the flagged activity occurred between 2021 and mid-2024, before the newer LitePSM system was introduced.
Block Analitica also questioned some of the links to North Korean actors, saying some wallets were several transactions away from known addresses and could belong to unrelated users. That caveat matters. But it's also fair to consider the adviser's relationship to the ecosystem when evaluating its conclusions. Even so, its response isn't meaningless - it's simply not the same thing as an independent, neutral audit of the underlying evidence.
CoinDesk's report also said many flagged transactions passed through services such as 1inch, ParaSwap, and MetaMask Swaps, which can route trades automatically. Routing through an aggregator complicates attribution: the user may not be choosing each intermediate venue, and the service's routing path alone doesn't show intent. That doesn't make monitoring irrelevant, but it changes what a transaction-level connection can actually prove.
A useful way to read blockchain attribution
It helps to break the claim into a few separate questions:
- What was observed? Which addresses and transactions were included, over what period, and how was volume calculated?
- How strong is the attribution? Is the wallet directly identified, or linked through multiple steps with uncertainty?
- What role did the protocol play? Did it custody, route, exchange, or just "encounter" funds as part of a broader path?
- What does the percentage measure? Is it gross transaction volume, unique funds, confirmed illicit proceeds, or activity flagged for further review?
Without those distinctions, a big dollar figure can sound more conclusive than the underlying evidence supports. And a small share of total protocol volume doesn't automatically mean there's no control failure. Scale matters, but so do severity and preventability.
Do Sky's reserve figures prove the system is safe?
Sky said it held about $9.3 billion in assets backing its stablecoins as of Friday. Its dashboard reportedly showed around $6.11 billion of USDS and DAI in circulation and roughly $93 million in reserves intended to cover potential losses. Those figures may suggest assets exceeded combined circulating supply at that point in time - but they shouldn't be read as a blanket guarantee that redemptions would work the same way under every future scenario.
A snapshot is still a snapshot, and the categories matter. A total reserve number doesn't automatically tell you how quickly each asset can be converted, whether it's exposed to market moves, where it's held, or whether it's accessible during stress. A balance sheet can look overcollateralized in aggregate while specific liquidity needs still break down in a particular module or asset. That's where the PSM's USDC balance and the broader reserve total address different questions.
It's also worth noting the mismatch between reported metrics. Sky cited about $2.3 billion in total value locked, while also citing $9.3 billion in assets on its reserve dashboard. Different measures can include different scopes, definitions, and timestamps. TVL may reflect assets deployed in a specific set of contracts, while a reserve dashboard may describe a wider pool of backing assets. They shouldn't be treated as if they're measuring the exact same thing.
Sky also reported a 37.8% 30-day decline in the combined circulation of USDS and DAI to $6.11 billion as of Nov. 20. That's another data point - not a final verdict. Supply dropping can reflect users reducing exposure, but it can also follow changes in demand, product usage, or portfolio decisions. The risk question is whether reserves and redemption channels adjust safely as liabilities change - and whether users can verify what the numbers are actually saying.
What reserve transparency should include
If you're trying to assess reserves, don't stop at one collateral ratio or headline number. A useful view would let a decision-maker identify:
- The assets counted as backing and how they're valued
- How much is available for immediate redemptions versus less liquid holdings
- Any issuer, custodian, smart-contract, or governance dependencies
- How often reserves are reported, and the timing behind those reports
- How potential losses are covered and what assumptions drive those estimates
On their face, the figures are encouraging - especially alongside Sky's claims that the peg held and PSM liquidity remained available. Still, a dashboard doesn't remove the need to understand asset composition, legal and technical access, and independent verification. Better visibility helps, but it doesn't replace the work of interpreting what the dashboard is measuring.
What should users and risk teams watch next?
The follow-up shouldn't be a binary decision based on one outflow day. The better approach is to monitor whether the system continues working as demand changes, and whether Sky's explanations - and its critics' - hold up against transparent, testable data.
For holders, start with the exit path. Confirm what asset a redemption delivers, which mechanism handles it, and whether there are rate limits, fees, or access conditions. If your position is large enough that even a short delay matters, don't assume a displayed $1 price guarantees instant conversion at that price. Operational access and market price are separate risks.
For institutional users and treasury teams, focus on concentration and dependencies. If your strategy relies on USDS, map its exposure to USDC and Circle, the PSM's available capacity, smart-contract controls, and any governance decisions that could change parameters. Then stress-test a scenario where redemptions are much larger, USDC liquidity becomes constrained, or a relevant address is frozen. The goal isn't to predict a failure - it's to know what your contingency plan actually covers.
For analysts, track several indicators together instead of relying on one headline:
- USDS market price across venues (not a single quote)
- PSM balances and redemption activity over time
- USDS and DAI supply, including how figures are defined
- Reserve composition, liquidity, and reporting cadence
- Updates to the illicit-activity analysis, including attribution methods and transaction-counting choices
- Any change in access, restrictions, or operational status for USDC used by the system
Also pay attention to source incentives. Sky's statements reflect the protocol's view. Block Analitica offers an ecosystem adviser's response. Inca Digital's analysis, as reported by CoinDesk, provides the starting point for the flagged-activity figures. They're different evidence types with different incentives and methods. A good risk review records the disagreement rather than treating one framing as settled fact.
Key takeaways
- Sky said USDS held its $1 peg while more than $2 billion was redeemed through its PSM.
- The reported PSM balance stayed above $800 million in USDC and later exceeded $1.1 billion.
- The $518 million figure refers to transactions linked to flagged wallets; it shouldn't automatically be treated as confirmed illicit proceeds or proof of protocol wrongdoing.
- Reserve totals, circulating supply, TVL, and immediately available redemption liquidity are different measures.
- The core test is whether users can verify backing and access a reliable exit as conditions change.
Conclusion
Sky's reported $2 billion redemption day matters because it put the USDS exit mechanism under real pressure. Sky said the peg held and that its PSM retained substantial USDC liquidity. At the same time, the dispute over flagged transactions highlights why blockchain analytics require context: transaction links, risk exposure, and confirmed misconduct aren't interchangeable claims.
For users and risk teams, the right takeaway is careful and measured. Treat the peg, redemption liquidity, reserve quality, and issuer dependencies as separate parts of one system. Then check whether the evidence is current, verifiable, and relevant to your own exposure. A stablecoin's resilience doesn't come from a calm chart - it's proven over time through transparent backing and dependable exits.