Tether USDT Reserves: What S&P's Weak Rating Means
S&P kept USDT at its lowest stability score, citing riskier reserves and disclosure gaps. Here’s what the assessment means for holders and institutions.

Tether's S&P Rating Is a Warning About USDT's Reserves, Not Its Peg
Tether's USDt (USDT) has kept its dollar peg through recent market conditions. But that doesn't tell the whole story about a stablecoin's resilience. On Nov. 18, S&P Global Ratings kept its stability assessment of USDT at 5 - the lowest score on its scale. S&P said the problem isn't just the reserves themselves, but also the growing share of higher-risk reserve assets and gaps in public information about how those assets are held and protected.
The rating is unchanged from November 2025. That distinction matters: S&P didn't announce a new downgrade. It also said its assessment can't go below 5, even though it identified more weaknesses. Tether rejected S&P's approach and pointed to The Big Short - arguing that traditional risk models have blind spots of their own.
That disagreement is worth unpacking, because it raises a question that applies to every major stablecoin: what kind of evidence should users require before treating a token as reliably redeemable for a dollar? This article breaks down what S&P's score is measuring, how USDT's reserve mix has shifted, what the disclosure gaps mean, and what holders and institutions can do to assess the risks without assuming a weak rating automatically equals an imminent failure.
What does S&P's score of 5 mean for USDT?
On Nov. 18, S&P's Stablecoin Stability Assessment rated USDT at 5, or "weak," which is the bottom of its scale. S&P framed the score as a judgment about how well a stablecoin can maintain its dollar peg. It considers factors like reserve backing, liquidity, and what's publicly known about the issuer and its controls.
A score at the floor is still a serious risk signal - but it's not a promise that USDT will lose its peg on a specific date. It also isn't the same thing as a credit rating for a government or corporate bond. In other words, the score doesn't automatically mean every token is unsupported right now, or that a redemption failure is already happening. It's closer to: S&P sees material weaknesses in the structure and the evidence behind the stablecoin's stability.
S&P also kept the score unchanged from November 2025. It said it found additional weaknesses, but it didn't change the number because the scale has no lower rating. Since the rating can't drop, the practical question is to look at why S&P gave a 5 - not just whether the score moved.
Tether's response challenged S&P's method rather than accepting S&P's reading of its reserves. The company argued the framework is the issue, and it cited The Big Short as a critique of ratings models. That may be a fair shot at how risk assessments are built, but it still doesn't resolve the underlying issues S&P pointed to: liquidity, asset protection, and disclosure.
S&P also acknowledged something that's easy to overlook when a score stays low - USDT has maintained strong price stability over the prior 12 months. That's real evidence. It just isn't the same as evidence for how the token would behave under different stress conditions, like a sudden drop in risk assets paired with a surge in redemptions.
Peg performance and reserve strength are different tests
A stablecoin can trade close to one dollar much of the time and still leave unanswered questions about how quickly and reliably all holders could be paid during a real stress event. Market price is shaped by supply and demand, access to trading venues, and confidence. Reserve quality and redemption arrangements are a different question: whether the backing can meet obligations when people want out.
So the clean takeaway isn't "USDT is about to fail," and it isn't "the peg held, so there's no risk." S&P's assessment is a warning about the resilience and transparency of the backing - not a declaration that a depeg is already underway.
Why does S&P consider the reserve mix riskier?
S&P said assets it classifies as higher risk - including gold, Bitcoin, public equities, secured loans, and corporate bonds - were equivalent to 28% of USDT in circulation as of Sept. 30. A year earlier, that figure was 24%. That's a four-point change, but whether it matters depends on what those assets are, how they behave during stress, and how quickly they can be converted into cash.
S&P's core worry is that a drop in the value of those holdings could leave reserves insufficient relative to tokens outstanding. That's a conditional risk - S&P isn't saying the reserve portfolio has already fallen short based on the report date. In the Sept. 30 figures, S&P showed about $191.5 billion in assets against $183.5 billion in liabilities, with roughly $7.95 billion in excess assets.
That excess looks like a cushion, but headline numbers don't answer everything. Some assets sell quickly during normal conditions, then trade at a discount when many holders are trying to exit at the same time. Others can be harder to value or may move in the same direction as the broader market shock. The real question is whether the value and availability of reserves hold up when redemptions rise - not just whether assets exceed liabilities on paper.
Risk is about liquidity as well as price
It's common to talk about risk as a matter of asset categories. For stablecoins, though, the operational details matter just as much: where assets sit, who controls them, what restrictions apply, and how long liquidation takes. A secured loan isn't the same as cash just because it has collateral. The collateral's quality, the legal claim, and how recovery works in a downturn all affect how useful it is under pressure.
The same idea applies to assets with active markets. Bitcoin and publicly traded equities can be sold, but their prices can drop fast. Gold may have a different market profile, but it still needs to be sold and settled. S&P's concern is that a broad decline across higher-risk holdings could weaken the cushion at the same time confidence is getting hit.
The 28% figure shouldn't be read as "28% of USDT is unbacked." It's how S&P groups and values assets within its higher-risk bucket compared with tokens in circulation. It's meant to identify exposure, not to forecast losses. The practical move is to assess reserve composition and liquidation characteristics alongside the total asset figure.
What do the oversight and disclosure gaps mean?
S&P pointed to the regulatory setup in El Salvador, where Tether relocated in January 2025. According to S&P's assessment, the National Commission of Digital Assets (CNAD) requires 70% of reserves to be held in assets that can be liquidated within 30 days. S&P argued that the rules are broad enough to include assets like gold, Bitcoin, and loans - which it considers relatively high risk.
A 30-day liquidity requirement isn't the same as a requirement to hold assets that can be turned into cash immediately with little or no loss. The details matter: how eligible assets are defined, how they're valued, how they're monitored, and what happens if liquidity deteriorates. Two frameworks can both use a similar time limit but still produce different levels of protection, depending on how liquidity is defined and what collateral is considered eligible.
S&P also raised a disclosure gap: it said there's no requirement to segregate reserve assets. Segregation generally means keeping assets backing customer claims separate from an issuer's operating assets and other obligations. S&P said publicly available information doesn't clearly show whether Tether's reserves are segregated, which limits how much outsiders can verify that the assets are insulated from broader corporate risk.
Why segregation and custody information matter
Reserves can look adequate on a balance sheet and still raise questions about legal ownership, access, and what happens if the issuer or a custodian runs into financial trouble. Segregation helps answer some of those questions, but the legal and operational specifics determine how much protection it actually provides. Lack of public information doesn't automatically prove reserves are mixed or inaccessible. It does make independent assessment harder.
S&P also noted that Tether's reserve reports don't name the custodians and counterparties holding the assets. Those details help outsiders judge concentration risk - whether assets are spread across many institutions or rely heavily on a small number of relationships. Without that information, it's harder to evaluate what might happen if a bank, custodian, or counterparty becomes unavailable.
This is where disclosure becomes a risk-control issue, not just a reporting preference. Public information lets users, counterparties, and regulators test assumptions instead of relying only on the issuer's summary. More disclosure won't eliminate market risk, but it can make that risk easier to spot and price.
Does Tether's audit address S&P's concerns?
Tether said that in August 2026, KPMG issued an unqualified opinion on its 2025 accounts, describing the work as the company's first full independent audit. An unqualified opinion is a meaningful result: it means the auditor didn't issue a modified opinion on the financial statements within the scope of the engagement. Still, it's not a guarantee that a company can't fail or that operational risks have been completely eliminated.
S&P's concern was that the audited statements and the auditor's report hadn't been published, which limited S&P's ability to review the underlying information. That distinction matters. An audit can be done - but if the relevant statements and report aren't available to outside reviewers, other parties can't verify the scope, assumptions, or findings themselves.
The source of assurance also matters. Tether's Sept. 30 reserve report was attested by BDO. An attestation and a full audit aren't the same thing. Their scope, procedures, and reporting can differ. Readers should check which figures each engagement covers, the date of the information, and whether the complete report is available. Even a good description from the company doesn't replace the report itself when the point is independent scrutiny.
Reporting frequency affects how quickly risk becomes visible
S&P also noted that Tether's reserve attestations are quarterly, while other stablecoins generally report monthly. More frequent reporting can shorten the time between a change in reserves and when that change shows up in public disclosures. That doesn't prove the data is complete or that the portfolio is safe, but it does make monitoring easier.
Quarterly reporting creates a longer gap where market conditions or reserve composition can shift without appearing in the latest public snapshot. For some users and counterparties, that may be workable depending on exposure and available alternatives. For institutions responsible for settlement, treasury, or customer funds, the reporting lag can affect limits, monitoring rules, and contingency planning.
A better test than the word "audit" alone is to look at what period and assets were covered, what kind of engagement was performed, whether the report is public, how often updated information is released, and whether key custody details are disclosed. Those factors make assurance more comparable - and more useful.
How should holders and institutions assess USDT?
Start by separating three questions that often get blended together. Is USDT trading near one dollar? Do reported assets exceed liabilities? And how confident can you be that reserves are liquid, protected, and actually available if redemption demand rises? The first is visible in market data. The second depends on issuer reporting. The third is where you need information about asset quality, custody, legal safeguards, and real operational access.
If you're an individual user holding a modest balance for a short period, your main exposure may be limited to the time the funds sit and the venues you can use to exit. If you're a business running substantial treasury balances, the same issues deserve stronger controls. Payment firms, exchanges, funds, and fintechs may have obligations to customers that don't pause when markets get volatile.
A practical review should include these checks:
- Exposure: How much USDT do you hold, and for how long? A temporary settlement balance is a different risk profile from a long-term treasury position.
- Redemption route: Can you redeem directly, or do you rely on an exchange or intermediary? Access terms and operational availability can matter as much as reserve headlines.
- Reserve evidence: What's the reporting date, how often is the information updated, and are complete audit or attestation materials publicly available?
- Asset and custody detail: Can you see what categories of assets are held, where they are custodied, and whether concentration or segregation risks are disclosed?
- Stress response: What would you do if USDT traded below one dollar, your redemption route became unavailable, or the value of higher-risk reserve assets fell sharply?
Match controls to the size and duration of exposure
There's no one-size-fits-all rule that every user should avoid USDT or that every institution should hold it. The right decision depends on the use case, the amount at stake, your time horizon, how you can redeem, and the cost of alternatives. A business using stablecoins for fast cross-border settlement might accept some exposure because the operational benefit is clear. But that doesn't mean it should treat stablecoins like cash in a bank account.
For larger exposures, it makes sense to use controls like setting balance limits, reducing how long funds sit idle, defining approved redemption channels, and planning for a period when liquidity is temporarily impaired. None of that requires predicting a collapse. It's about building resilience to multiple outcomes, including market stress, operational outages, or delayed access to funds.
This same discipline applies when comparing USDT with other stablecoins. Don't just look at the name of an auditor or the history of peg stability. Compare the reporting itself, reserve mix, legal framework, redemption mechanics, and custody arrangements. A stablecoin is both a financial instrument and an operational dependency. Its price stability is only one piece of the overall picture.
Conclusion
S&P's assessment is best read as a warning about what backs USDT and how much outsiders can verify about that backing - not as proof that the dollar peg has already failed. The score stayed at 5, and S&P's concerns about the higher-risk share of reserves, safeguards, custody disclosure, and reporting still matter.
For users and institutions, the practical response is to match exposure to evidence. Look at how reserves are reported, whether the information is detailed and current, and how you'd access funds during market stress. A stablecoin can be useful for payments and settlement without being risk-free or interchangeable with cash in every context.